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Abstract:  It is easy to demonstrate that Sen’s SWF satisfies Pareto criteria.  This paper questions the 
philosophy of this concept and shows that it is possible to formulate a generalized SWF, which can be 
non-Paretian under special circumstances.  This paper also demonstrates a method of decomposition of 
the proposed SWF by subgroups of population using a Gini decomposition method developed by Podder.  
The method is applied to investigate the trend of welfare in Australia at regional level using the 
Household Expenditure Survey data of 1983-84 to 1993-94.  It is found that the states NSW, Victoria and 
Queensland, with the maximum total income share, had almost 70 percent of the share of total welfare.  
The elasticity of welfare with respect to mean i ncome showed a prominent increasing trend for NSW.  It 
is also observed that the relative share of welfare decreased for NSW, Victoria, South Australia, 
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A social decision maker, concerned about the welfare of society, besides considering equity also 
considers the improvement of efficiency of the society.  Although the definition and acceptability 
of equity creates problems, defining efficiency in welfare economics has been successfully 
achieved through the Pareto principle.  Because of its innocuous nature this principle is widely 
accepted and it is one of the fundamental properties of a Social Welfare Function (SWF).  
However, this principle has some rudimentary disadvantage.  If a rich person becomes richer due 
to some policy change according to this criterion this change is acceptable.  That means the 
efficiency criterion always overshadow the equity criterion of a welfare consideration if 
Paretianity is accepted.  In the next section we demonstrate this property of SWF and develop a 
generalized SWF which is flexible and non-Paretian under special cases.  As Gini coefficient is 
one of the arguments of the proposed SWF, it is not possible to decompose the SWF by population 
subgroups in a formal way.  In section III, we have used the Podder method of Gini decomposition 
to show the process of decomposition of the SWF.  Section IV analyses the regional variation of 
welfare in Australia during 1983-84 to 1993-94.  Some concluding remarks follow in the last 
section. 
 
II  SWF and Pareto Criteria 
 
Given an income vector, ( , , , ) x x xn 1 2 L , representing the distribution of income in society, the 
general form of the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function can be written as: 
 
(1)    W W x x xn = ( , , , ) 1 2 L  
 
This function is supposed to be increasing and unique up to a monotonic transformation and 
permutation symmetric in incomes.  Sometimes, it is called a social welfare functional because it is 
argued that W depends on the individual utilities which, in turn, are the functions of real income.  
Thus if we denote ui ui xi = ( )  as the utility of the ith person, then we get the utilitarian form of it 
as: 
 
(2)    W W u x u x u x n n = [ ( ), ( ), , ( )] 1 1 2 2 L  
   2
The form of the SWF as given in (2) is termed welfarist by Sen
1 because of its sole dependence on 
individual utilities.  Since the utilitarian social welfare function depends only on individual utilities 
which in turn depend on the consumption bundle, or real income of each person, it does not allow 
for any externalities.  While the level of utility of a person may depend on her consumption bundle 
or income, some disutility may be created due to inequity in society as a whole.  Most people 
would agree that equity and efficiency are the twin concerns of a social planner or decision-maker.  
Therefore, a common non-utilitarian form of the of the Bergson-Samuelson SWF may be written 
as: 
(3)    W W S = ( , ) q  
where S stands for total income representing efficiency and q q = ( , , , ) x x xn 1 2 L denotes a  
measure of inequality representing inequity.  A SWF of the above type must satisfy the following 
conditions: 








> < 0 0 , and   
In addition if the SWF is assumed to be Paretian it must satisfy the additional condition: 





> 0  for all i 
This means that any addition to anyone’s income, other things remaining the same, must increase 
social welfare.  Thus, (to take an extreme case) if there is an increase in the income of the richest 
person of society, welfare will increase.  Note that ceteris paribus, an increase in the richest 
person’s income will increase inequality as well as total income.  But the increase in welfare due 
to the increase in total income must be greater than the decrease in welfare due to the increase in 
inequality. This means that (5) implies: 



















i + > 0 
this principle deals with the “efficiency” aspect of the SWF.  If the efficiency gain of the entire 
society is enjoyed by the richest person (or group) whether it is a welfare gain or not is the 
question.  For the utilitarian SWFs any growth process is welfare augmenting who ever be the 
beneficiary.   
 
                                                 
1 Sen (1979) and several other articles by him afterwards. 
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The admissible set of SWFs satisfying the above conditions is enormous.  Some further 
restrictions are needed to be imposed to narrow down the set.  Sen (1974) with the help of four 
axioms has introduced axiomatically a Bergson-Samuelson class of SWF as: 
(7)  W = m(1-G),  
where m is the mean income of society and G is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution.  
Sen (1976) shows that this index, calculated from income distribution, ‘is a sub-relation of social 
preference relation defined in the distribution of commodities’.
2  It is easy to prove that Sen-SWF 
is also Paretian.  For the Sen-SWF the rate of substitution between inequality and efficiency at a 









Clearly the SWF is highly sensitive to mean income and less sensitive to inequality.  As both G 
and m are determined by the income profile of society and cannot be varied by the decision-maker 
at different levels of growth or income distribution, this SWF is very rigid.  The marginal welfare 
with respect to mean income, in this case, is (1-G) which is a constant.  Thus in the case of 
international comparison this SWF will always be biased in favour of developed countries, which 
have high per capita income and relatively low inequality.  Also for any country the welfare status 
over time may not be comparable using this SWF if the country experiences a high growth rate 
because of industrialisation at the cost of adverse income distribution. 
 
The Sen-SWF may be easily modified to make it more general and flexible.  Such a class 
of generalized SWF can be presented as: 
(9)  W = m 
b (1 - G),   0 £ b £ 1 
 












Clearly one here, has the choice of b and thus the SWF is now flexible with respect to the trade-off 
between efficiency and equality.  If one wants to attach more importance to efficiency than 
                                                 
2 Alternatively Yitzhaki (1979, 1982) showed that this index could be based on relative deprivation.  Sheshinski 
(1972) also derived this index from Gini coefficient.  Dagum (1990, 1993) arrived at the same SWF from a somewhat 
different premise.  Dagum arrived at a general form, W=m(1-q) where q can be any inequality measure, from the 
utilitarian premise.  He assumes individual utility to depend on the person’s income as well as whole income 
distribution.  Thus the approach is different from the traditional utilitarians. 
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equality he will choose a high value of b, that is near one, and on the contrary if he is an equity-
lover he will set a low value for b.
3   
 
Let us now examine whether this SWF is Paretian or not.  From equation (5) we know that 
the SWF is Paretian if:  





b m  
which implies: 




1 2 - -
> + -b b ,  for i=1,..,n 
4 
This expression is always true from the lowest income to the median income as the left hand side 
of the last line of expression (12) is always positive.  With the knowledge of the existing level of 
inequality in the society, by varying the value of b, one can easily determine the direction of a 
change in social welfare when a person, above the median, gains some additional income (other 
things remaining the same).  If the condition of Paretianity is satisfied for the richest person it will 
satisfy for others, thus putting maximum value of i in (12) we get:  







For a large n this can be written as: 
 
(14)  b b + - ‡ G G 1 
 
which will never be satisfied for a value of b less than 1.  Thus this SWF is Paretian for the highest 
possible value of  b, in which case this SWF will become the Sen-SWF.  It is obvious from 
condition (14) that if only the richest person or the richest group enjoys the fruit of growth, the 
welfare of the society will not increase as long as b<1.  This SWF might be criticised for its bias in 
favour of the poor.  If there is a rise in income of the poorest whatever be the value of b and G (in 
the specified range, that is, between 0 and 1), the welfare must increase.  Thus this SWF has some 
Rawlsian flavour.  However, for a Rawlsian SWF if the richest person’s income increases social 
welfare remains unchanged, but for our SWF (with b<1) with an increase in income of the richest 
                                                 
3 The value of b can be well above 1 for a more efficiency prone person, however whenever b‡1 the proposed SWF is 
Paretian (can easily be followed from the proof discussed next).  As our argument is against Paretianity we are 
restricting ourselves to the upper limit 1, when it is the special case of Sen-SWF. 
 
4 The mathematical derivation is attached in the appendix. 
   5
person social welfare decreases.  This class of SWF (with b<1) is not Rawlsian and not Paretian as 
well. 
 
III  Decomposition of SWF by Subgroups of population 
 
It is known that the Gini coefficient cannot be decomposed by subgroups of population in 
terms of formal between group and within group Ginis
5, however, it can be decomposed in a 
different way using the Podder method (see Podder, 1993).  This study has shown that using the 
same technique our SWF could be decomposed by different population subgroups.  We try to 
represent total welfare as a weighted sum of individual welfare of various subgroups.  Thus our 









where Wi is the welfare of the ith subgroup and W i is the weight attached to the individual group 
welfare and it is assumed that there are g subgroups. 
 










where Ci is the concentration coefficient (defined as Podder, 1993) of group i, ni is the number of 
people in group i and mi is that group’s mean income.  n and m are the total size of the population 
and mean income of the whole population respectively.  As the concentration coefficient Ci lies in 
the interval (-1,1) and satisfies the Pigou-Dalton condition of progressive transfer from a higher 
ranked individual to a lower ranked individual, it serves as an indicator of inequality of that group.  
Thus we write: 
                                                 
5 See Cowell (1995).  A whole list of reference in this respect can be found in Foster and Sen (1997). 
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, the weight attached to the subgroup i.  And  ) 1 ( i i i C W - =
b m  is the welfare 
of the group i.
6  Clearly as long as 0<b<1 the weight will not be summed up to unity.  For b = 1 
(ie, for the Sen-SWF) this same kind of decomposition establishes a relationship of total welfare as 
a weighted average of individual welfare of subgroups (see Podder and Mukhopadhyay, 1995, 
1999).  The weight depends on the population share of the subgroup, the proportional mean 
income of the group and the value of b.  As the value of b increases the importance of proportional 
mean income decreases in the weight.   
 






































represents the relative welfare share of each subgroup.  This share depends on the income share of 
that subgroup and on the concentration coefficient of the subgroup.  In this share the coefficient b 
has no role to play.  The reason is quite obvious.  The parameter  b serves as the trade-off 
coefficient between equity and efficiency.  When our interest is to find the relative contribution of 
one sub-set of population to total welfare the question of trade-off between efficiency and equity 








some interesting interpretation.  We call it the ‘relative equity of group i’.  It is known that if the 
                                                 
6 As Ci represents ith group’s inequality and mi the mean income of the group there should not be any confusion to 
represent Wi=mi
b(1-Ci) as the ith group’s welfare. 
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concentration coefficient of any subgroup is higher (lower) than the overall Gini coefficient that 
subgroup has inequality augmenting (reducing) effect.
7  Thus if the value of the relative equity is 
greater (less) than 1 the ith subgroup will have inequality reducing (augmenting) effect.  Hence, 
the relative share of total welfare of any subgroup changes due to change of two factors – (a) its 
share of income and (b) its relative equity.   
 
  The relative contribution of welfare has another interesting interpretation.  It is also 
possible to derive the elasticity of SWF with respect to equity (i.e., one minus the concentration 
coefficient) of one subgroup without changing its mean income.  This elasticity for ith subgroup 
























Clearly this is nothing but the relative welfare share of the  ith subgroup.  Therefore another 
interpretation of relative welfare share of any subgroup is the elasticity of welfare with respect to 
the equity of that subgroup.   
 
  As we are always interested to find the target group for policy purposes it is of more 
interest to derive the elasticity  of welfare for a proportional change in income of a subgroup 
without disturbing the income distribution.  This elasticity can be defined as: 



























Thus the relative share of welfare of subgroup i is equal to the elasticity of welfare with respect to 
the mean income of that subgroup if b=1 (because the first term of the right hand side vanishes for 
b=1).  If 0<b<1, this elasticity is less than relative welfare share (as in that case, the first term of 
the right hand side is negative).  The higher the relative income share of a subgroup the more the 
absolute value of the first term of equation (20).  Thus for a proportional increase in income a 
high-income subgroup has more reducing effect than for a low-income subgroup.  Here lies the 
nicety of this SWF.  The decision-maker considering this elasticity for policy prescription would 
be able to choose the target group. 
 
                                                 
7 That is, if an extra dollar goes to this group inequality will increase (decrease). 
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  From equation (18) and (20) it is obvious that the target group would be that section of 
population for which both relative share of welfare and elasticity with respect to the mean income 
of the group are high.  And these are high for the group where relative equity is high and relative 
income share is substantial.  Hence, for policy purpose two most important factors are relative 
equity and income share. 
 
IV  Regional Disparity in Australia: 1983-84 – 1993-94 
 
Australia is a vast country with varied regional differences.  This country is divided into six 
states and two territories.  They are New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, 
Western Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory.  For 
geographical reason some of the states are very rich and some are relatively barren.  As external 
trade comprise a large portion of Australian national income, the cities with harbour facility 
flourished most.  Naturally the share of population (as well as income) in those cities (and states) 
is relatively high compared to the land locked states and territories.  Along with that, the variation 
of the policies of the different state governments creates regional disparities.  The constitution of 
Australia confers some powers in the area of the policy of redistribution of income and wealth to 
the federal government.  An important power is the provision of social service payments, but the 
states also have the power to undertake this type of activity.  There are strong arguments in favour 
of restricting distributional policies to the federal sphere.  The belief is that a single state might not 
be able to pursue independent distributional objectives successfully.  Principally, if one state 
undertakes generous welfare policies in comparison to others it could face budgetary problems and 
higher levels of welfare payments could provoke an inflow of welfare recipients that would in turn 
lead to higher state taxes.  These increased taxes in turn could cause the flight of productive 
resources from the state.  The way out of this vicious circle is to continue a uniform regulation of 
redistributional tools operated at the federal level.  Therefore, the federal government needs to be 
aware of the welfare situation of different states.  In this section we investigate, using the method 
developed in the previous sections, this variation from a welfare perspective and sought policies 
for the country as a whole which can be welfare augmenting. 
 
  For this analysis the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) data published by the 
Australian Beaurau of Statistics for the years 1983-84, 1988-89 and 1993-94 have been used.  For 
the HES data set of 1988-89 for reasons of confidentiality the state of residence of the reference 
person was not published.  The present analysis for that year uses the relevant information from   9
Podder (1992).
8  Six states and two territories are considered.  They are New South Wales (NSW), 
Victoria, Queensland (Qld), South Australia (SA), Western Australia (WA), Tasmania, Northern 




Trend of Social Welfare in Australia for Different States – 1983-84 to 1993-94 
 



















NSW  10.01  9.96  9.96  39.83  39.60  38.64  158.51  157.44  154.56 
Victoria  10.14  9.83  10.11  40.53  39.46  39.87  161.97  158.38  157.14 
Qld  10.44  10.50  10.09  40.66  40.64  39.87  158.30  158.39  157.46 
SA  10.54  9.95  9.77  41.18  38.95  38.66  160.90  152.39  153.08 
WA  10.55  10.33  10.25  41.43  40.58  40.38  162.69  159.35  159.16 
Tasmania  10.38  10.95  10.32  40.65  42.14  40.03  159.18  162.14  155.25 
NT  -  8.60  8.97  -  35.30  36.72  -  144.94  150.24 
ACT  8.23  10.23  7.82  34.47  42.59  33.24  144.29  177.34  141.39 
Total  10.12  10.02  9.76  40.20  39.71  38.91  159.63  157.57  155.10 
 
  In Table 1 the total and group welfare for different values of b are presented.  It is observed 
that whatever be the value of b the total welfare has decreased over the last decade.  For the Sen-
SWF (ie, when b=1) between 1983-84 and 1988-89 welfare decreased by 1.3 percent and the 
decrease was 1.57 percent between 1988-89 and 1993-94.  By using the value of b=0.5 the 
corresponding figures are 0.99 and 2.6 percent and when b=0.75 the corresponding figures are 
1.22 and 2.02 percent.  For lesser value of b the decrease is more prominent in the recent years.  It 
is known that the Gini coefficient during this period increased by 0.022 point (from 0.364 to 
0.386) which is almost three times the increase of the coefficient during the other interval (the 
value of the Gini coefficient calculated for the year 1983-84 is 0.351).  Clearly this increase of 
inequality is compensated by lesser decrease in mean income when the value of b is high.   
                                                 
8 The measures were based on a sample size of 7405 households.  The sample size for the year 1983-84 is 9571 and 
that for the year 1993-94 is 9733.  Thus after using the weight total coverage of the three surveys were respectively 
5010.2 thousands, 5420.4 thousands and 6616.8 thousands households.  To calculate the Gini and concentration 
coefficients the micro data was arranged in ascending order of per capita income of the household and the size of the 
household is used as the weight. 




Contribution of Welfare and its Components of Different States: 1983-84 to 1993-94 
 
  Total Income Share (%),  
nimi/nm 
Relative Equity,  
(1-Ci)/(1-G) 




















NSW  22.61  25.05  27.25  0.984  0.984  0.984  22.25  24.65  26.82 
Victoria  22.11  19.15  20.43  0.989  0.951  1.060  21.87  18.21  21.66 
Qld  16.32  13.48  12.94  1.073  1.094  1.054  17.51  14.75  13.64 
SA  10.38  9.81  7.88  1.075  1.016  1.015  11.16  9.97  8.00 
WA  11.63  10.41  7.53  1.065  1.047  1.075  12.39  10.90  8.09 
Tasmania  7.37  8.27  8.33  1.055  1.156  1.118  7.78  10.14  9.31 
NT  -  6.46  8.53  -  0.797  0.873  -  5.15  7.45 
ACT  9.58  7.73  7.11  0.732  0.922  0.704  8.83  7.13  5.01 
 
  Between 1983-84 and 1988-89 social welfare of Tasmania and ACT increased, by 5.5 
percent and 24.3 percent respectively for b=0.5.  When b=1 the increase is 1.9 and 22.9 percent 
respectively.  During this period the concentration coefficient for Tasmania decreased from 0.323 
to 0.260 (both lower than total Gini of the respective periods) and for the ACT this decrease was 
from 0.530 to 0.410 (both higher than total Gini of the respective periods).  However, the 
population and income shares of these two regions varied within 6 to 9 percent.  Thus these shares 
had a negligible effect on the total change of welfare.  The highest population and income share 
were found (around 25 percent) for NSW and Victoria.  Both these states showed a decrease in 
welfare with the only exception being Victoria in the recent years (for b=0.5 and 0.75).  In this 
period there was a 0.04 point decrease in the concentration coefficient for this state.  For the year 
1983-84, data for Northern Territory was not available.  In this region for all values of b welfare 
increased between 1988-89 and 1993-94.   
 
  The sensitivity of change in b is extremely prominent for Tasmania.  During 1993-94, with 
respect to state welfare Tasmania ranked first when the value of b is 0.5, the rank increased with 
the increase in value of b.  When b=0.75 Tasmania ranked second and it ranked fourth when b=1.  
For this state inequality was low.  However, average income of this state was also low and with 
high values of b the equity aspect was over shadowed.  The opposite case happened in the ACT in 
1988-89.  Because of its high per capita income, despite high inequality, with b=0.75 and 1 it 
ranked first.  However, when b=0.5, that is when stress on efficiency aspect decreased, the rank 
became 4. 
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  Table 2 presents the relative share of welfare of different states along with its income 
shares and relative equities over the years.  The maximum share in welfare was contributed by 
NSW, Victoria and Qld.  For Qld the relative equity increased over time while the income share 
decreased continuously.  The relative share of welfare for ACT is minimum during 1993-94 which 
decreased from 7.13 percent to 5.01 percent during 1988-89 to 1993-94, because of the decrease in 
both income share and relative equity.  The trend of contribution in total welfare was similar for 
WA.  For this state the reason was different as the relative equity for this state increased in the 
recent period while the total income share decreased.  For a subgroup if relative equity is greater 
(less) than one, that means that subgroup has an inequality augmenting (reducing) effect.  Table 2 
shows that for states Tasmania, WA, SA and Qld the inequality reducing effect was always 
present.  This means if any extra dollar goes to these states and if proportionately distributed, the 
total welfare of society will increase.  On the other hand NSW had a marginal inequality 
augmenting effect.  Inequality augmenting effect was highest for the ACT during 1993-94.  For 




Trend Elasticity of Social Welfare with Respect to Mean Income in Australia for Different States – 
1983-84 to 1993-94 
 
  W
i m h (b=0.5)  W
i m h  (b=0.75)  W



















NSW  0.109  0.121  0.132  0.166  0.184  0.200  0.199  0.221  0.241 
Victoria  0.108  0.086  0.114  0.163  0.134  0.166  0.197  0.163  0.196 
Qld  0.093  0.080  0.072  0.134  0.114  0.104  0.159  0.134  0.123 
SA  0.059  0.051  0.041  0.086  0.075  0.060  0.101  0.089  0.072 
WA  0.066  0.057  0.043  0.095  0.083  0.062  0.112  0.099  0.073 
Tasmania  0.041  0.060  0.051  0.059  0.081  0.072  0.070  0.093  0.085 
NT  -  0.019  0.032  -  0.035  0.053  -  0.045  0.066 
ACT  0.040  0.032  0.015  0.064  0.052  0.032  0.079  0.064  0.043 
 
Table 3 presents the elasticity of social welfare with respect to mean income of different states for 
different values of b for the three years under consideration.  This elasticity quantifies the expected 
change in total welfare for one percent increase in mean income of the state (which is distributed 
proportionately among all members so that no change occurs in terms of inequality).  Only the 
states of NSW and NT showed a continuous increase in this elasticity.  Different reasons for this 
increase could be found from Tables 1 and 2.  For the state of NSW relative equity remained the 
same through out.  Thus the increase in elasticity is due to the increase in total income share of this 
state.  For the NT both total income share and relative equity increased, however for this state both 
total income share and relative equity were very low, and numerical value of elasticity was also   12
low.  For Qld, SA, WA and ACT this elasticity has decreased continuously.  This is because for 
most of the cases relative equity decreased, and for all the cases total income share of the state 
decreased.  The change in elasticity did not show any pattern for Victoria and Tasmania.  An 
analysis of Table 2 shows the presence of inequality reducing effect for Tasmania and a marginal 
inequality augmenting effect for NSW.  However, Table 3 shows that if the extra dollar goes to 
Tasmania it does not help much for the whole society despite its inequality reducing factor.  Rather 
if this extra dollar goes to NSW and if it is distributed proportionately to all members of the state, 
welfare increase will be of a maximum amount. 
 
V  Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the welfare disparities at the regional level in  Australia over the period 
1983-84 to 1993-94 using Household Expenditure Survey data.  To explore this, a generalized 
class of SWF is proposed, which can be non-Paretian under special circumstances.  Also the 
decomposition method of this SWF by subgroups o f population has been demonstrated.  The 
method is showed to be useful in the determination of the target group.  Using this decomposition 
analysis we are now able to find out the reason for the change in share of social welfare of various 
regions.  Two components are found out to determine the trend of social welfare: the total income 
share of the state and the relative equity.  Relative equity has also another important implication to 
indicate the inequality reducing (or augmenting) characteristics of the region. 
 
A gradual decrease of total welfare in Australia over time is observed.  Regional disparities, 
related to share of welfare were prominent.  NSW, Victoria and Qld with the maximum total 
income share, had almost 70 percent of the share of total welfare.  For Qld while the income share 
decreased over time, relative equity showed an upward trend.  As both income share and relative 
equity at ACT decreased during 1988-89 to 1993-94, relative share of welfare of this state 
decreased during this period.  On the contrary the reason for a similar trend during the same period 
in the case of WA was found to be a large decrease in only income share (and this decrease 
overshadowed the increase in relative equity).  Inequality reducing effect is found to be present in 
the states Tasmania, WA, SA and Qld, while ACT and NT have an inequality augmenting effect.  
The elasticity of welfare with respect to mean income showed a prominent increasing trend for 
NSW, because of its increasing total income share.  Between the period 1983-84 and 1993-94 the 
relative share of welfare decreased for Victoria, SA, Qld and ACT and increased for Tasmania and 
NT. 
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Derivation of equation (19) 
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